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Case No. 20050453-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Johnny Udell, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of methamphetamine, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (West 2004), and 
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(e) (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did defendant's live-in girlfriend have authority to consent to the search of 
defendant's residence? 
Standard of Review. The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error. State v. 
Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, If 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are 
reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its application of the legal 
standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, If 11,103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const., amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug free 
zone, a second degree felony; possession of marijuana in a drug-free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor. R. 2-1. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his 
home. R. 49-43. After hearing argument on the matter, the court denied the motion. R. 
60,67-63,98. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to possession of 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and possession of marijuana, a class B 
misdemeanor. R. 84-77, 99. Defendant reserved the right to appeal the trial court's 
denial of his motion to suppress. R. 81-80. Defendant was sentenced to a prison term 
of up to five years for the third degree felony and a jail term of 180 days for the class B 
misdemeanor. R. 93-92. The prison and jail terms were suspended and defendant was 
placed on probation. R. 93-91. Defendant timely appealed. R. 95. 
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Summary of Facts 
At the request of defendant's ex-wife, American Fork City police officers were 
dispatched to defendant's residence to conduct a welfare check on his son. R. 67 (f 1). 
As defendant spoke with the officers outside his front door, his live-in girlfriend, 
Monica Auff hammer, also stepped outside. R. 66 (% 2). The officers noticed that she 
smelled strongly of burnt marijuana and exhibited other signs of recent drug use. R. 66 
(Tf 2). The officers asked to speak with her in private and defendant re-entered his 
home. R. 66 (^ f 3). When the officers told Auffhammer that they suspected drug use, 
she began crying and admitted that both she and defendant had smoked marijuana in 
the last hour. R. 66 (^ f 4). She also admitted that drugs and drug paraphernalia were in 
the home. R. 66 (^ 4). Officers asked Auffhammer for consent to enter the home to 
search and retrieve the drugs and paraphernalia. R. 66 (f 5). She gave consent. R. 66 
(115). 
When the officers entered the home, defendant objected and demanded that they 
leave immediately and secure a warrant to search his home. R. 66 (^ f 6). When 
defendant became physically threatening to the officers, he was handcuffed to ensure 
the safety of both the officers and defendant. R. 66 (If 6). Auffhammer then assisted the 
officers in a search of the home and curtilage, directing them to the location of drugs 
and paraphernalia. R. 66 (^ f 7). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court ruled that defendant's live-in girlfriend "possessed the authority 
to grant consent to search Defendant's residence without a warrant and without regard 
to Defendant's protests." R. 65-64. Defendant does not dispute this ruling of actual 
authority. Instead, he argues that the court should have suppressed the evidence 
because the officers did not have enough information to reasonably believe that the 
live-in girlfriend had the authority, i.e., the "apparent authority." The State need not 
show both "actual authority" and "apparent authority." It need only establish one. 
Because the trial court's ruling of actual authority is unchallenged, defendant has 
waived it on appeal and this Court should affirm. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS BASED ON ITS 
UNCHALLENGED RULING THAT DEFENDANT'S LIVE-IN 
GIRLFRIEND HAD ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO CONSENT 
The trial court ruled that because Auffhammer shared a close relationship with 
defendant as his live-in girlfriend and enjoyed complete access to the home, she 
"possessed the authority to grant consent to search Defendant's residence without a 
warrant and without regard to Defendant's protests/7 R. 65-64. On appeal, defendant 
does not dispute the trial court's ruling that Auffhammer had authority to consent to 
the search. See Aplt. Brf. at 5,8-11. Instead, he argues "that 'at the moment' the officers 
entered his home they [did not have] enough information to determine Auffhammer 
had common authority over his residence." Aplt. Brf. at 5, 8-11. In sum, defendant 
challenges Auffhammer's "apparent authority" at the time of the search. Defendant's 
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claim fails because the trial court's finding of "actual authority" justifies the warrantless 
search, whether or not apparent authority also existed. 
A. The Law of Third Party Consent. 
"[0]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a 
warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent." 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,219 (1973). Police may obtain that consent either 
from the person whose property is to be searched or from a third party who shares 
common authority over the property. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,171 (1974). 
"A third party's consent to search is valid if that person has either the 'actual authority' 
or the 'apparent authority' to consent to a search of that property." United States v. 
Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215,1221 (10th Cir. 2004). Therefore, where actual authority exists, 
the State need not prove apparent authority. See United States v. Aghedo, 159 F.3d 308, 
311 (7* Cir. 1998). 
1. Actual Authority. 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), articulated the test for determining 
whether a third party had "actual authority" to consent to a search of property. State v. 
Duran, 2005 UT App 409, If 11, 535 Utah Adv. Rep. 42. Matlock explained that "[t]he 
authority which justifies the third-party consent . . . rests . . . on mutual use of the 
property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that 
it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the 
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their 
number might permit the common area to be searched." 415 U.S at 171-72 n.7. 
Therefore, under the Matlock test, a third party has actual authority to consent to a 
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search "if that party has either (1) mutual use of the property by joint access, or (2) 
control for most purposes over it." United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323,1329 (10th Cir. 
1999); accord Kimoana, 383 F.3d at 1221; Duran, 2005 UT App 409,«[[ 11. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that "[mjutual use of property by 
virtue of joint access is a fact-sensitive inquiry which requires findings by a court that 
the third party entered the premises or room at will, without consent of the subject of 
the search/' Rith, 164 F.3d at 1330. On the other hand, "control for most purposes of 
property is a normative inquiry dependent upon whether the relationship between the 
defendant and the third party is the type which creates a presumption of control for 
most purposes over the property by the third party. If the relationship creates such a 
presumption of control and is unrebutted, the third party has authority to consent to a 
search of the property." Id. The Tenth Circuit has recognized that "[relationships 
which give rise to a presumption of control of property include parent-child 
relationships and husband-wife relationships." Id. 
2. Apparent Authority. 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), set forth the test for "apparent authority," 
i.e., whether the consenting third party had "apparent authority" over the premises, but 
who in fact did not. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, f^ 14. Rodriguez held that mistaken 
reliance on third party consent does not violate the Fourth Amendment "'if the facts 
available to the officer at the moment . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises." Id. at 188 (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). Rodriguez thus held "that the Fourth 
Amendment is not violated when officers enter without a warrant when they 
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reasonably, although erroneously, believe that the person who consents to their entry 
has the authority to consent to this entry/'' United States v. Gutierrez-Hermosillo, 142 F.3d 
1225,1230 (10th Cir. 1998); accord Kimoana, 383 F.3d at 1221. If the facts do not support 
such a belief, "then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless 
authority actually exists/7 Rodriguez, 497 U.S at 188-89. 
The test for determining whether the third party had apparent authority "is an 
objective one: '[W]ould the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . warrant a 
man of reasonable caution [to believe] that the consenting party had authority over the 
premises?'" Gutierrez-Hermosillo, 142 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188); 
accord Duran, 2005 UT App 409, fl 14; Kimoana, 383 F.3d at 1222. The Tenth Circuit has 
explained that "[p]olice officers must evaluate the surrounding circumstances in order 
to determine whether a reasonable person would 'act upon [the invitation] without 
further inquiry/" Kimoana, 383 F.3d at 1222 (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188). 
B. Analysis. 
On appeal, defendant claims that the search of his residence was invalid because 
"the State failed to prove that 'at the moment' the officers entered his home they [did 
not have] enough information to determine Auffhammer had authority over his 
residence." Aplt. Brf. at 8. This is a challenge to the apparent authority of 
Auffhammer. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188. Had the trial court relied on apparent 
authority in justifying the search, defendant's claim might have merit. But it did not. It 
relied on actual authority. The trial court ruled that Auffhammer "possessed the 
authority to grant consent to search Defendant's residence without a warrant and 
without regard to Defendant's protests." R. 65-64 (emphasis added). 
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As explained above, actual authority does not turn on the reasonableness of the 
officer's belief based on the known facts at the moment of entry. Cf. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 
at 188-89 (holding that if facts do not support a reasonable belief that the consenting 
party has authority over the premises, the search is unlawful "unless authority actually 
exists"). To show actual authority, the State must present evidence at a suppression 
hearing that the consenting party had "either (1) mutual use of the property by joint 
access, or (2) control for most purposes over it." Rith, 164 F.3d at 1329; accord Kimoana, 
383 F.3d at 1221; Duran, 2005 UT App 409, % 11. 
Defendant relies on United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and 
State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1998), for the proposition that ambiguity 
requires further inquiry. Aplt. Brf. at 9-11. Defendant's reliance on these cases is 
misplaced because they are limited to "apparent authority" cases. In neither case did 
the government argue on appeal that the third party had "actual authority" to consent 
to a search.1 As a result, both courts examined the searches under the "apparent 
authority" analysis articulated in Rodriguez. See Whitfield, 939 F.2d at 1073-75 (holding 
that the information available to the officers was "insufficient to establish apparent 
authority" under Rodriguez); Davis, 965 P.2d at 532-35 (citing Whitfield in support of its 
In Whitfield, the district court's conclusion that Whitfield's mother did not have 
actual authority to consent to a search of her adult son's clothing was unchallenged on 
appeal. 939 F.2d at 1073-75. In Davis, this Court noted that defendant Hyatt's 
testimony that her live-in boyfriend (Davis) had "access to" her car was insufficient to 
establish that he had common authority over the car because "in addition to access, 
common authority requires a showing of 'mutual use' by persons 'generally having 
joint access or control for most purposes.'" Davis, 965 P.2d at 535 n.5 (quoting Matlock, 
415 U.S. at 171 n.7). 
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conclusion that the information available to the officers did not "reasonably support[ ] a 
belief that Davis had common authority" over his girlfriend's car). Therefore, both 
cases are inapposite. 
Defendant has not briefed or otherwise challenged the trial court's ruling of 
actual authority. He has thus waived it on appeal and this Court should not consider 
that ruling. See Coroles v. Sahey, 2003 UT App 339, \ 17, 79 P.3d 974 (holding that 
because plaintiffs did not brief the claim, they waived it on appeal). Based on the trial 
court's unchallenged ruling of actual authority, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted December 29, 2005. 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
/i——— —-y^-g^t^ 
£y S. Gray y 
ssistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
Moreover, where defendant failed to challenge the trial court's ruling of actual 
authority in its opening brief, it is precluded from challenging it in his reply brief. See 
State v. Krueger, 2000 UT 60, If 20, 6 P.3d 1116. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on December 29,2005,1 served two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, Johnny Udell, by causing them to be 
delivered by first class mail to his counsel of record as follows: 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
99 East Center St. 
P.O. Box 1895 
Orem, UT 84059-1895 
12/29/20051:11 PM 
Fey S. Gray 
Assistant Attorney General 
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KAY BRYSON # 0473 
Utah County Attorney 
Jason Sant #9145 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 
°®Qut>, 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHNNY UDELL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 041401566 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This case is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence obtained as 
a result of a search of his residence. The State is represented by Jason Sant and David Stewart 
represents the Defendant. 
Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress and submitted a memorandum in support of his 
Motion on October 21, 2004. On November 19, 2004, the State filed it's Response to 
Defendant's Memorandum. Finally, on December 1, 2004, this Court following argument and 
clarification by the parties made it's Ruling denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 26, 2004, American Fork police officers were dispatched to the 
residence of Johnny Udell, the defendant, to conduct a welfare check on his son at 
the request of the defendant's ex-wife. 
1 
GQU67 
2. While speaking with officers, the defendant's live-in girlfriend, Monica 
Auffhammer, exited the home. She smelled strongly of burnt marijuana and 
exhibited other signs of recent drug use. 
3. Officers asked to speak with her in private at which time Mr. Udell excused 
himself and re-entered the residence. 
4. The officers expressed their suspicions regarding drug use to Ms. Auffhammer. 
She became upset, cried, then admitted that both she and the defendant, Mr. Udell, 
had smoked marijuana within the past hour. Additionally, she admitted that more 
drugs and paraphernalia were still on the premises. 
5. Officers asked for and were granted consent, by Ms. Auffhammer, to enter and 
search the home to retrieve all narcotics and paraphernalia she spoke about. 
6. Upon entering the home, the defendant, Mr. Udell objected to the officers' 
presence in the residence, demanding that they exit the residence immediately and 
secure a warrant. He became physically threatening and was subsequently 
handcuffed to ensure the safety of both defendant and officers. 
7. Ms. Auffhammer then assisted the officers in their search of the residence, 
directing them to various locations throughout the residence and it's curtilage 
where several items containing drugs and other paraphernalia were found. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. Probable Cause to Search. 
Probable cause existed sufficient to search the residence. Probable cause exists where the 
facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
^ i 6 B 
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in 
the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085,1088 
(Utah 1986). The question is, then, did the officers have enough particularized and trustworthy 
information to give rise to the reasonable belief that an individual has committed or is 
committing a crime. 
When Auffhammer exited the residence she smelled strong of burnt marijuana. The 
officer, as a drug recognition expert, immediately recognized the odor. Moreover, after 
informing the woman of their concerns she admitted that she had used the drug within the past 
hour. 
The odor of marijuana combined with Auffhammer's admission to recent use provided 
sufficient probable cause to search. 
II. Consent to Search 
A third party may consent to a search of another's property if the third person has 
"common authority" over or a sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be 
inspected. U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,171 (1974). Co-inhabitants of a property assume the 
risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. State v. Davis. 965 
P.2d 525, 532 (Utah App. 1998). "Voluntary consent of any occupant of a residence to search 
the premises that is jointly occupied is valid against the co-occupant, permitting evidence 
discovered in the search to be used against him at a criminal trial." Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169. 
This is the case, even if the other party objects. 
Ms. Auffhammer is the defendant's live-in girlfriend. She and the defendant, though not 
married, share a close relationship. She lives in his home and has complete access to the home. 
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Therefore, Ms. Auffliammer having standing, "common authority" and sufficient connection to 
the premises possessed the authority to grant consent to search Defendant's residence without a 
warrant and without regard to Defendant's protests. 
ORDER 
Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court HEREBY 
ORDERS Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED. 
Signed this ¥ day of y^Am^cr/ , 2004 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the / i —"day of December, 2004, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
David Stewart 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
245 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
(801)852-1070 
m$dfati 
5 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
riLtzu wo]*"' 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
or utan uounty, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE 
JOHNNY 
OF UTAH, 
vs. 
UDELL, 
Plaintiff, ) 
Defendant. ) 
ORIGINAL 
Case No. 041401566 FS 
Suppression Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
December 1, 2004 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS, 
Fourth District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
Jason Sant 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
100 East Center Street 
Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 
David A. Stewart 
(No address provided) 
(No phone number provided) 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT 
1909 South Washington Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-0027 
W c ^ # i i 
f 3 * ' p ? f* „ 
^ £,f-J<J«J 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on December 1, 2004) 
3 MR. STEWART: Your Honor, we were anticipating putting 
4 on some evidence today, but we decided not to, and just submit 
5 it for decision. 
6 THE COURT: Okay, we have a motion to suppress. We 
7 have the State's respond to — response to defendant's motion 
8 to suppress. The timing is a bit critical as it relates to the 
9 application of law. Tell me how and when did the police learn 
10 to believe that the girlfriend lived at the residence? Was it 
11 before or after the search or when? 
12 MR. STEWART: I think — you know, I haven't discussed 
13 that with Mr. Sant at all. I think it's been a belief that she 
14 was a — at least an overnight guest, which gives her standing. 
15 However I, you know, I don't know what her status is as it 
16 relates to a residence, having a common authority or not. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. At what stage did they learn that 
18 she, you know, in terms of issues of standing — 
19 MR. SANT: Your Honor, from my understanding in talking 
2 0 to Officer Holland before he moved to Alabama, was that they 
21 had been aware at least of Mr. Udell, and had seen both of them 
22 at the residence together several — on several occasions in 
23 passing by the home. 
24 Mr. Udell was suspected — a suspected drug user to 
25 them. So they kind of kept an eye on him. I don't know exactly 
-3-
1 I when they discovered that they were living together. I have no 
2 idea because neither officer had told me exactly when they knew 
3 that; but it was discovered that they were living together. 
4 THE COURT: Okay, but at least over some period of time 
5 J they became aware that she was either living there or together 
6 
7 | MR. SANT: At the very least, living there off and on. 
THE COURT: In light of that, then she — then the 
9 I standing issue evaporates. I'll deny the motion to suppress 
10 by virtue of those representations; and then we need to go from 
11 there. 
12 You'll need to prepare an order denying the motion to 
13 suppress, based upon your briefing, and then a supplemental 
14 information as it relates to the officer's acquaintance with 
15 the girlfriend and observations of her there on occasions as to 
16 reason for purpose of standing. Now what? 
17 MR. STEWART: Your Honor, if we could set this for 
18 entry of plea, probably in sometime in January. 
19 THE COURT: We can do that. 
2 0 COURT CLERK: January 12TH at 8:30, 
21 THE COURT: Sir, if you'll step forward and sign a 
22 promise to appear in connection with that day. Thank you. 
23 (Hearing concluded) 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
) ss . 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That this proceeding was transcribed under my 
direction from the transmitter records made of these 
meetings. 
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and 
contains all of the evidence and all matters to which the 
same related which were audible through said recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore, the name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 1st day of June 2 005. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 2008 
severly Lowe 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Utah County 
BEVERLY LOWE 
Notary Public 
State of Utah ¥ 
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